Friday, June 29, 2012
Supreme Court Decision on Health Care Law
http://billtidd.com/2012/04/10/affordable-care-act/
Thursday, May 3, 2012
Growth Spurt?
So after more than twenty years, and despite having sworn I never would, I started running again. At first just a couple miles at a whack. Then boosting up to four. I'm now putting in up to six miles, or one lap around Central Park, a few times a week.
Now I don't know about my cholesterol, still waiting for that follow up appointment, but I sure have lost a few pounds. In fact, while according to online BMI calculators I am still a tad overweight, just a pound or two, I have been, for the first time in my adulthood, "in range" on more than one extra skinny day.
You know. Skinny days. When you forget to drink water all day and become excessively dehydrated. And got a haircut. And trimmed your fingernails.
I can tell you that the first time that happened there was much rejoicing in the Tidd household, on the level of what Chaim Potok has long attributed to my Hasidic neighbors. There was much singing and dancing and general cheerfulness. Lachlan is still trying to figure out what all the hubbub was about, but nevertheless continues to voice his approval in the usual way: “Again! Again, again!”
The downside to weight loss is, of course, the cost of re-outfitting oneself. With all my clothes looking loose and shlumpy, my Christmas list was straightforward. Being bold, I asked for new trousers with a 32-inch waist, a size I have not required in several decades, and was delighted come Christmas morning to receive a new pair of JCrew’s “Vintage Slim” jeans. Very nice. I tried them on and found they were all I had dreamt of and more, with one exception.
They were too short.
And I mean way too short. As in not fit for public viewing. A showcase for bony ankles. Flood city.
A trip to the store confirmed it was not a problem with that particular pair. I now had another inch of leg. I was befuddled. Where had this come from? I have always worn 32-inch length trousers. It was only my waist that expanded over time. But now that my middle was snapping back better than a pair of Fruit-of-the-Loom tightie-whities, had my legs stretched out to compensate?
Of course not. A trip to the height wall in Lachlan’s room confirmed I haven’t grown. (Though to be clear I haven’t shrunk, either. I’m still the tallest Tidd around, i.e. the tallest one I see on a daily basis.)
The answer to the “Mystery of the Missing Inch”, which if all goes well will soon be a reality TV show on ABC Family, became clear enough when I lined my new 32x32 trousers up with a pair of my older and more bagel-friendly 33x32s, also “Vintage Slims”. While JCrew says both pairs are the same length, the 33s were, in fact, an inch longer. How can this be, I ask? And then it hit me.
The length of 32 inches is a measure of the inseam, the inside of the leg, not the outside. And the inseam of both pairs of jeans was... drum roll... exactly the same! But when JCrew cuts an inch off the distance around the waist, reducing it from 33 to 32, they in their wisdom also cut an inch off the vertical distance from the waist to the beginning of the inseam at the bottom of the crotch. (I realize a diagram would really help about now.)
Bottom line: there is an inch of difference but no way you can tell by looking at the label. Eureka, Watson, you're a genius! Why thank you, Holmes, it was elementree, really.
But, you are saying, couldn't he tell when he tried them on? Weren't they, you know, a little snug? Truth be told, the 32's were still comfortable despite the missing inch. Why? Well I’m not 100 percent sure but, since you are being so pushy about it, I have a hypothesis: my ahem has shrunk along with my waist, and isn't as low to the ground.
That’s what Lachlan tells me, anyway. It's not like I've now grown eyes in the back of my head too. But that makes me think clothing manufacturers need to add a third metric to their sizing charts to clarify the issue. Not sure what to call it. Seat Circumference? Total Butt Volume?
I don't know. Never been too good at naming things (Sorry kids). Maybe that's why I'm Watson. I'll ask Sherlock what he thinks.
[PAUSE]
All I can get out of Sherlock is: "Again! Again, again!"
Friday, April 13, 2012
The Real Reason for the Tragedy of the Titanic
By CHRIS BERG
In the 1958 Titanic film "A Night to Remember," Captain Smith is consulting with the shipbuilder Thomas Andrews. After the two realize that the Titanic will sink and that there are not enough lifeboats for even half those aboard, Smith quietly says "I don't think the Board of Trade regulations visualized this situation, do you?"
In the run-up to the 100th anniversary of this tragedy this weekend, there's been a lot of commentary about who and what were to blame. Left unsaid is that the Titanic's lifeboat capacity is probably the most iconic regulatory failure of the 20th century.
The ship had carried 2,224 people on its maiden voyage but could only squeeze 1,178 people into its lifeboats. There were a host of other failures, accidents, and mishaps which led to the enormous loss of life, but this was the most crucial one: From the moment the Titanic scraped the iceberg, the casualties were going to be unprecedented.
Yet the Titanic was fully compliant with all marine laws. The British Board of Trade required all vessels above 10,000 metric tonnes (11,023 U.S. tons) to carry 16 lifeboats. The White Star Line ensured that the Titanic exceeded the requirements by four boats. But the ship was 46,328 tonnes. The Board of Trade hadn't updated its regulations for nearly 20 years.
Artistic rendering of the Titanic from Le Petit Journal Paris, April 28, 1912
The lifeboat regulations were written for a different era and enforced unthinkingly. So why didn't the regulators, shipbuilders or operators make the obvious connection between lifeboat capacity and the total complement of passengers and crew?
It had been 40 years since the last serious loss of life at sea, when 562 people died on the Atlantic in 1873. By the 20th century, all ships were much safer.
Moreover, the passage of time changed what regulators and shipowners saw as the purpose of lifeboats. Lifeboats were not designed to keep all the ship and crew afloat while the vessel sank. They were simply to ferry them to nearby rescue ships.
Recent history had confirmed this understanding. The Republic sank in 1909, fatally crippled in a collision. But it took nearly 36 hours for the Republic to submerge. All passengers and crew—except for the few who died in the actual collision—were transferred safely, in stages, to half a dozen other vessels.
Had Titanic sunk more slowly, it would have been surrounded by the Frankfurt, the Mount Temple, the Birma, the Virginian, the Olympic, the Baltic and the first on the scene, the Carpathia. The North Atlantic was a busy stretch of sea. Or, had the Californian (within visual range of the unfolding tragedy) responded to distress calls, the lifeboats would have been adequate for the purpose they were intended—to ferry passengers to safety.
There was, simply, very little reason to question the Board of Trade's wisdom about lifeboat requirements. Shipbuilders and operators thought the government was on top of it; that experts in the public service had rationally assessed the dangers of sea travel and regulated accordingly. Otherwise why have the regulations at all?
This is not the way the story is usually told.
Recall in James Cameron's 1997 film, "Titanic," the fictionalized Thomas Andrews character claims to have wanted to install extra lifeboats but "it was thought by some that the deck would look too cluttered." Mr. Cameron saw his movie as a metaphor for the end of the world, so historical accuracy was not at a premium.
Yet the historian Simon Schama appears to have received his knowledge of this issue from the Cameron film, writing in Newsweek recently that "Chillingly, the shortage of lifeboats was due to shipboard aesthetics." (Mr. Schama also sees the Titanic as a metaphor, this time for "global capitalism" hitting the Lehman Brothers iceberg.)
This claim—that the White Star Line chose aesthetics over lives—hinges on a crucial conversation between Alexander Carlisle, the managing director of the shipyard where Titanic was built, and his customer Bruce Ismay, head of White Star Line, in 1910.
Carlisle proposed that White Star equip its ships with 48 lifeboats—in retrospect, more than enough to save all passengers and crew. Yet after a few minutes discussion, Ismay and other senior managers rejected the proposal. The Titanic historian Daniel Allen Butler (author of "Unsinkable") says Carlisle's idea was rejected "on the grounds of expense."
But that's not true. In the Board of Trade's post-accident inquiry, Carlisle was very clear as to why White Star declined to install extra lifeboats: The firm wanted to see whether regulators required it. As Carlisle told the inquiry, "I was authorized then to go ahead and get out full plans and designs, so that if the Board of Trade did call upon us to fit anything more we would have no extra trouble or extra expense."
So the issue was not cost, per se, or aesthetics, but whether the regulator felt it necessary to increase the lifeboat requirements for White Star's new, larger, class of ship.
This undercuts the convenient morality tale about safety being sacrificed for commercial success that sneaks into most accounts of the Titanic disaster.
The responsibility for lifeboats came "entirely practically under the Board of Trade," as Carlisle described the industry's thinking at the time. Nobody seriously thought to second-guess the board's judgment.
This is a distressingly common problem. Governments find it easy to implement regulations but tedious to maintain existing ones—politicians gain little political benefit from updating old laws, only from introducing new laws.
And regulated entities tend to comply with the specifics of the regulations, not with the goal of the regulations themselves. All too often, once government takes over, what was private risk management becomes regulatory compliance.
It's easy to weave the Titanic disaster into a seductive tale of hubris, social stratification and capitalist excess. But the Titanic's chroniclers tend to put their moral narrative ahead of their historical one.
At the accident's core is this reality: British regulators assumed responsibility for lifeboat numbers and then botched that responsibility. With a close reading of the evidence, it is hard not to see the Titanic disaster as a tragic example of government failure